This paper compares the current foreign direct investment (FDI) recession with FDI responses to past economic crises. The authors find that although developed country outflows have taken an equally big hit as major developed countries have after past crises, outflows seem to be bouncing back more slowly this time. By contrast with the overall decline in recent years, inflows to emerging markets often remained stable during their past economic crises. Both patterns indicate that the global scale of the current crisis has led to a greater FDI response than after individual country crises in the past. Compared with global economic downturns since the 1970s, the current FDI recession has also been greater in magnitude. The exception is the FDI plunge in the early 2000s, despite the much smaller economic crisis at the time. The authors conclude by recommending that policymakers not just further liberalize FDI regimes-as they find was the typical pattern during earlier crises-but rather use the downturn to rethink their FDI policies with an enhanced focus on "sustainable FDI" promotion.
Disentangling more detailed implications of the crisis for TNCs is difficult, depending inter alia on the types and extent of production and financial linkages between parent firms and foreign affiliates, sector and industry characteristics, host and home state economic performance, modes of entry, and so forth.
2 Rather than trying to sort out the many complex, and at times endogenous, channels through which the crisis has impacted FDI patterns in detail, the aim of this article is simpler. Taking a bird's eye view, we ask just how bad the "FDI recession" has been in the wake of the crisis compared to previous crisis episodes. Has it been unique either in terms of its severity or political response? By comparing the current FDI recession with FDI patterns during and after crises in the past may in turn provide insights to how long the FDI slump can be expected to last. We conclude by recommending policymakers to go beyond simply further FDI liberalization-as was the pattern during earlier crises-but rather use the downturn to rethink their FDI policies with an enhanced focus on "sustainable FDI" promotion.
the FdI recessIon In BrIeF
All main FDI components have been negatively affected since 2007 (figure 2). Even after sales and profits of foreign affiliates began to bounce back in late 2009, parent companies continued to repatriate large shares of their profits rather than invest in host states (UNCTAD 2011) . Intracompany loans have dwindled as well, as TNCs have restructured their operations-for instance, by relocating activities to countries that have weathered the crisis-and compelled their foreign affiliates to assist parental balance sheets at home. As a result, host countries have not only tried to attract new FDI during the crisis, they have struggled to retain what they already have. As we shall see later, this pattern is very similar to past crises, where the fall in more liquid FDI components was the main driver when FDI levels declined.
What is perhaps more worrying is therefore the proportionate decrease in equity investment. This is notable, as equity investments reflect the long-term strategic commitment by multinationals to their host countries and are typically not determined by short-term factors such as liquidity demands or tax considerations, unlike reinvested earnings and intracompany loans (Desai, Foley, and Hines 2003; Ramb and Weichenrieder 2005) . The stagnant level of equity investments may therefore signal that a recovery of FDI flows could take longer after this crisis, a possibility we will return to later.
Given that the crisis started in Western countries and economic growth is by far the most important determinant of FDI, it comes as no surprise that FDI flows to and from developed countries have declined the most so far (figure 3). The downturn has had a particularly strong impact on Western banks and financial institutions, which as a result had to cancel, postpone, or downscale cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As)-the most important mode of entry for FDI. The global drop in FDI has therefore primarily been due to the dive in cross-border M&A deals of developed-country companies since 2007, which has led to a 67 percent decline in cross-border M&As worldwide (despite a slight M&A rebound in 2010).
For emerging economies, FDI remained an important stabilizer in the early stages of the crisis.
While their net inflows of portfolio investments and bank lending were negative in 2008 (IMF 2009), their FDI inflows actually increased, albeit at a slower pace than previous years, and outflows grew as well. to continue as well, as many "Southern" TNCs are increasingly investing abroad, and particularly so in other emerging markets (Sauvant, Maschek, and McAllister 2010) .
Secondly, the policy response to the crisis has been rather favorable to TNCs overall. With respect to the international investment regime, some countries are slowly moving toward a rebalancing of rights and obligations between investors and their host countries. Yet, this shift in favor of host countries is not directly related to the crisis, but rather a response to the rising number and impact of investor-state arbitrations over the last decade (Waibel et al. 2010) . And it should not be taken as an indication that the international investment regime is unraveling, as investment promotion and protection treaties are still signed in large numbers, either as stand-alone agreements or as parts of preferential trade agreements.
Finally, it is worth recalling that although the rush to sign investment treaties has indeed slowed compared to a decade ago-and a few countries have even begun canceling theirs-this is unlikely to have a significant impact on global investment flows (see e.g., Yackee 2010 and Poulsen 2010).
For rather than investment rules on the international level, national FDI regimes are the main policy drivers of FDI flows. And where data are available, there are no signs that the crisis has led to a protectionist backlash at this level either. While expropriation of foreign assets in the natural resources sector was beginning to become fashionable before the crisis in parts of Latin America, for instance, falling commodity prices in the initial stages of the crisis made expropriation less attractive for policymakers (Lloyd's 2009) . With respect to less extreme forms of FDI restrictions, recent years have seen an increase in limitations on cross-border M&A activity, particularly when target firms were considered strategic industries or when investment was facilitated through sovereign or quasi-sovereign entities (Sauvant 2009 Given these uncertainties, it may be informative to look at FDI patterns during past crises for hints about the prospects for recovery in TNCs' investment activity. Not because past events are necessarily a good indicator for present conditions, but rather to see if the current FDI recession is unique in terms of its scale or policy reactions.
FdI durIng pAst crIses

Individual country crises
We begin by looking at FDI patterns during individual country crises. As a benchmark for the 2007 subprime crisis in the United States, Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) assembled historical data on 18 bankcentered financial crises in developed countries. Unlike the current downturn, however, several of these were relatively minor affairs and we therefore focus on the so-called "big five" systemic financial crises, which all led to major drops in economic performance for several years: Spain (1977 ), Norway (1987 ), Finland (1991 ), Sweden (1991 , and Japan (1992). One indicator of the greater effect of this crisis on inflows to emerging markets compared to past crises is that earnings and intracompany debt exhibited much more procyclical patterns than equity investments during past crises in emerging markets (World Bank 2009, pp. 51-54) . In order to limit the impact of economic turmoil in host countries without having to sell off assets, TNCs often reduced intracompany loans to a much greater extent than equity holdings (figure 7). As an example, American TNCs in countries affected by the Asian crisis repatriated all their income from the region to parent companies (World Bank 2009, p. 52). 5 Thus, while TNCs-like portfolio investors-typically pulled out funds from emerging markets in economic turmoil, they didn't give up on their long-term strategic commitment there. This is somewhat in contrast to the current downturn, where equity investments have declined substantially in both absolute and relative terms.
Fire sale FdI
One reason FDI flows have not constituted the same stable source of finance for emerging markets during this crisis, as they did during crises in the past, may be that liquidity constraints make so-called "fire sale"
FDI less widespread today than in past crises (Calderon and Didier 2009) . Fire sale FDI occurs when plunging domestic prices, combined with greater access to finance by foreign firms, leads to bargain sales of domestic assets to foreign buyers, typically through cross-border M&As.
The phenomenon has mostly been discussed in the context of the East Asian crisis, where the low price for acquired domestic firms has been offered as an explanation for the sharp rise in cross-border M&As, while domestic M&As declined (Aguiar and Gopinath 2005) . Survey evidence suggests that 60 percent of large M&A deals in South Korea, for instance, were perceived by the seller and/or buyer to have been acquired at bargain prices below their "real" value (Zhan and Ozawa 2001, p. 67) . More generally, firm-level liquidity appears to have played a key role in the spurt in foreign acquisitions of East Asian assets at the time. Also, acquisitions tended to be control seeking to a greater extent during the crisis than in normal years, and they were quickly sold back to domestic buyers after the crisis Yorulmazer 2007, 2009 ).
But does this mean that fire sales were a defining characteristic of the Asian crisis and perhaps of economic crises in general? Not necessarily. Cross-border M&A levels in the crisis-hit countries were actually quite limited compared to other regions (Zhan and Ozawa 2001, p. 71) . This goes both for the ratio of M&A sales to FDI flows (figure 8) and the total value of M&A deals. Both Argentina and Brazil, for instance, had higher values of foreign M&As than Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand combined.
Also, proactive governments often assisted troubled local firms to avoid foreign takeover at bargain prices (Zhan and Ozawa, 2001, pp. 69-72) . Governments in Malaysia, South Korea, Indonesia, and
Thailand thus actively intervened, and at times blocked negotiations over the sale of local assets to foreign investors. As a result, much of the fire sale that actually did take place in East Asia was targeted at securi-5. Similarly, while there was a net inflow of US FDI to Mexico in 1995, the current assets of US affiliates there dipped while equity components remained stable, suggesting pullout of liquid funds (Graham and Wada 2000, pp. 794-796) .
tizing nonperforming loans (as opposed to real business units), which can hardly be regarded as a contentious "loss" of valuable national assets.
Accordingly, it is questionable whether fire sales of domestic companies and assets were particularly widespread even in the East Asian crisis. So while some international investors undoubtedly took advantage of bargain prices spurred by past crises and investors with easy access to funds (such as some sovereign wealth funds) do the same today, it remains an open question whether fire sale FDI is a general characteristic of economic crises. Hence, it seems doubtful that low levels of FDI flows during the current downturn can be explained solely, or even mainly, in terms of lower levels of fire sale FDI.
The more obvious-though related-explanation for the greater impact of the current crisis on FDI flows is the global scale of the downturn, which has inflicted financial injury on TNCs around the world, forcing them to downscale FDI activities. Accordingly it may be informative to review crises that were not specific to individual countries, but rather global in character.
global crises
We follow Freund (2009 Freund ( ) in identifying 1975 Freund ( , 1982 Freund ( , 1991 Freund ( , and 2001 as prolonged global downturns. In these episodes, world real GDP growth: (1) fell below 2 percent; (2) dropped more than 1.5 percentage points from previous five-year averages; and (3) was at a minimum level compared to two years before and after. Figure 9 plots global real FDI inflows against GDP growth around the four crises.
During the oil shocks and the downturn in the early 1990s, it took an average of three years for after 9/11, this did not reverse the overall trend of prior decades, where investment liberalization and promotion "replaced red tape with red carpet treatment of foreign investors" (Sauvant 2009, p. 222) . In other words, governments tended to either liberalize, or maintain already liberal FDI policies during the crisis-just as they seem to be doing today.
Fourth, an alternative argument against a recovery path as long as the early 2000s could be that
TNCs from emerging economies are now in a position to take the lead. In recent decades, emerging economies appear to have performed better after advanced economies' downturns (IMF 2010, box 1.1).
Countries like China and India that are rapidly increasing in importance as both hosts and sources of investment could thus soften the current FDI recession. But, although growing in importance, one should not exaggerate the role of emerging-market outflows: For now they constitute only around one-fourth of world FDI outflows. So although favorable investment prospects in key emerging markets combined with increased South-South flows does imply that emerging-market FDI could bounce back faster than that of developed countries 8 -as they in fact did in the early 2000s-Southern TNCs can surely not be relied upon to pull global FDI out of its current slump. Full recovery from the FDI recession will only come when New York, London, and Frankfurt can again become M&A powerhouses. And given the injury the crisis has inflicted on Western banks and corporate giants, this will take time. 
conclusIons
When gazing into the "crystal ball" to forecast when, and how, the world will recover from the FDI recession, it is worth recalling that just as economists' predictions of financial resilience before the crisis turned out to be false, any predictions of recovery could similarly be wide of the mark. This includes our own. But even if the worst of the current downturn has faded in the rear-view mirror and world FDI bounces back quicker than we expect, do our observations provide any implications for investment policymakers?
We think so. First of all, it is important to keep in mind that the scope and duration of the FDI recession primarily depends on how governments address the underlying macroeconomic risks of the 8. This expectation accords with the results of a June 2010 survey conducted by the Economist Intelligence Unit on behalf of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). According to those soundings, around 40 percent of the almost 200 surveyed executives expect to increase their investments to developing countries over the next year (MIGA 2010) global economy in the coming years-including continued threats to financial stability. Here FDI policies play only a minor role. And even if restraints on protectionist urges can go some way to facilitate investments from abroad-and in some cases enhance the benefits of existing FDI (Moran 2005 )-in most countries this will do little to eradicate the damage resulting from the crisis. Investment policymakers should therefore avoid myopia: in the vast majority of countries, the recovery path from the crisis will not be paved by ever greater incentives for TNCs, more favorable investment contracts, or a rush to enter into investment treaties.
Rather than desperately scrambling to increase the volume of FDI flows, officials might instead use the downturn as an opportunity to take a step back and update their thinking. In recent decadesincluding during times of crises-host country FDI policies have largely focused on increasing the volume of inward investment. In some cases, this is indeed still necessary. But surely not all FDI promotes development, so larger quantities of foreign investments cannot be the indicator of a successful FDI policy as such. To increase the positive impact of FDI for economic development, and avoid the damages, officials should instead consider a "sustainable FDI" strategy, which enhances not only the quantity of investments, but also the "quality" (Vale Columbia Center and WAIPA 2010) .
Naturally, administrative and political constraints will prevent wholesale reforms of FDI regimesparticularly as the crisis demands a focus on other pressing policy areas for most governments. So a more prudent and realistic approach will instead be to target the most binding constraints for sustainable FDI promotion. 9 These are bound to be country and sector specific. If more fair contract and treaty negotiations can provide the greatest benefits for a country, scarce resources would be best spent investing in more in-house legal expertise. If it is greater links between foreign investors and domestic firms, providing technical and other support to potential domestic suppliers could prove instrumental (see UNCTAD 2001). In some cases environmental damages will be the greatest obstacle for sustainable FDI promotion, and yet in others foreign investors taking advantage of nontransparent and corrupt state institutions is what must be addressed. And so forth.
Suffice it to say, this is easier said than done. It requires considerable expertise and institutional capacity at national and subnational levels, features that are often absent in emerging markets in particular. And if not carefully implemented, reforms could conflict with investment treaty obligations, and thereby expose governments to expensive investor-state arbitrations. Multilateral organizations, aid donors, and nongovernmental agencies will therefore clearly have important roles to play. Academics can contribute too. Rather than providing long laundry lists of institutional and governance reforms, they could instead focus on operational methodologies to identify where investment policymakers realistically 9. See generally the ideas on a diagnostic approach to development policies by Hausmann, Rodrik, and Velasco (2007) .
can get the 'biggest bang for the reform buck' (Hausmann, Rodrik, and Velasco 2007) . Finally, TNCs can often benefit as well from promoting more sustainable and transparent FDI regimes.
Ultimately, however, policy reforms have to start at home. Governments therefore ought to consider whether the crisis should simply prompt more liberalization in an attempt to attract TNCs-as was the pattern during earlier crises-or rather mark the beginning of sustainable FDI regimes at the national and international levels. In most cases, the balance between the two will do little to prolong or shorten the FDI recession over the next few years, but it will surely have important economic and social welfare implications over the longer term. year before crisis = 100 percent Notes: The "big five" refers to the bank-centered financial crises in Spain (1977) , Norway (1987 ), Finland (1991 , Sweden (1991) , and Japan (1992). All FDI figures were initially converted into constant prices using the US GDP deflator.
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